

## **Political Islam between the Caliphate and the Modern State**

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### **Abstract**

This article deals with the attitude of the Islamic movements towards the political system of the Modern State and analyzes the relationship between the two sides. It also sheds light on the development of the political discourse of these movements in the modern era. Islamic movements called for revival of the Caliphate System in the twentieth century, and gradually their political discourse developed into acceptance of the idea of the establishment of a modern Islamic State through the system of a Modern State. This development characterized the discourse of the majority of the Islamic movements, mainly the movement of the Islamic Brothers, who started to believe in the possibility of the application of the Islamic Law in the Modern State.

Adoption of the system of the Modern State by the Islamic movements caused an intense debate between the supporters and opponents of this system and their disagreements centered on the difference between the values and principles on which each system is established: the Islamic System and the Modern System. This difference made the supporters of the Modern State work on bringing together the principles of modernity and the Islamic principles and thoughts.

**Keywords:** Islamic movements, Modern State, Caliphate, Political Islam, Muslim brother.

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## Introduction

The question of 'the Islamic State' raises various and contradictory reactions by those who deal with Islam as a thought, action and affinity, and these reactions range between objection and support<sup>2</sup>. This term became current after the fall of the Ottoman Caliphate, when the Moslems felt there was a political vacuum and absence of the system that represented the umbrella that gathered all of them, which reached its extreme in the last decades after the participation of the Islamic

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<sup>2</sup> There have been different attitudes regarding the establishment of the Islamic State. Some supported it while others opposed it. The term of "Political Islam" prevailed among the Islamic movements who believed in the possibility of applying the Islamic Sharia through the Modern State, which pushed these movements to take part in the political elections in the following countries: Egypt (the Moslem Brothers, al-Nur wa al-Wasat); Tunis, (al-Nahdha); the Sudan (The Moslem Movement); Maghreb (the Development and Justice); Jordan (the Islamic Movement); Algiers (Jabhat al-Inqadh/ Salvation Front); Turkey (The Justice and Development Party); Kuwait (The Islamic Constitutional Movement: Pakistan (al-Jama'a al-Islamiya/ the Islamic Group); Palestine (Hamas). This movement included a large number of scholars and intellectuals, including: al-Qardhawi, Abu Yaqub al-Marzouqi, Mohammad Amara; Salim al-Awwa; Hassan al-Turabi; Mohammad Said Rayan; Rached al-Gannouchi, and others. Those who opposed the idea of the Islamic idea come different countries and had different goals. Some of them believed that it is important to join the process of development and modernity, such as the patriotic and national, socialist and democratic parties, in addition to the religious movements, the Sufi groups; Jama't al-Da'wa wa al-Tabligh; and other groups who turned to self-reformation and individual and making social good. Besides, the main stream of Islam in Indonesia, which is represented in two Islamic associations: Nahdhat al-Ulama' (Renaissance of the Scholars), (al-Jam'iya al-Muhammadiya), who refuse the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia and see that they are not suitable to this country.

movements in the parliamentary and municipal elections and the different political activities in the frame of the Nation State.

Political Islam believes in the possibility of the application of the Islamic Law through the Modern State, and consequently, the Islamic movements, which were active politically in the Moslem World, worked hard to reconcile between the secular values and Islamic values, considering them as one non-contradictory thing. These movements adopted the idea of the establishment of a Modern Islamic State through the system of the Modern State, and try to achieve it through the political participation in the regime of the National Modern State<sup>3</sup> as Islam did not see any contradiction between the Democratic System and Islam, and tried to worked hard to bring them closer and establish it doctrinally and jurisprudentially<sup>4</sup>. This approach bears calls for renovation and modernization and adaptation of Islam to the changes and cataclysms of time, and the viability of Islam to development and progress.

In return, researchers object to the idea of application of the Islam through the Modern State claiming that modernity is inconsistent with Islam and demanded separation between Religion and the State. For example, Ali Abd al-Razeq claimed that there is no political system in Islam. "Mohammad, God's peace be upon him, was nothing but a messenger of a pure religious call (da'wa) for religion, who was not blemished by a tendency of a king, or a call for a state, and the Prophet had no property or government, and he did not establish a state of a kingdom in the political meaning of these words and their synonyms; he was

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<sup>3</sup> al-Turabi, Hassan (1989). *al-Haraka al-Islamiya fi al-Sudan*. Khartoum, p. 196-203.

<sup>4</sup> al-Ghannouchi, Rachied (2012). *al-Democratiya wa Huquq al-Insan fi al-Islam*. Markaz al-Jazera li al-Dirasat wa al-Dar al-Arabiya li al-Ulum Publishers. Daoha and Beirut.

nothing but a messenger like his previous brother messengers, and was not a king or a founder of a state or a caller for property"<sup>5</sup>.

I will argue in this book that Sharia principles cannot be enacted and enforced by the state as a public law and public policy solely on the grounds that they are believed to be part of the Sharia.<sup>6</sup>

The separation of Islam and the State does not prevent Muslims from proposing policy or legislation stemming from their religious or other beliefs. All citizens have the right to do so, provided they should support such proposals with what I call "civic reason." The word "civic" here refers to the need for policy and legislation to be accepted by the public at large, as well as for the process of reasoning on the matter to remain open and accessible to all citizens. By civic reason, I mean that the rationale and the purpose of public policy or legislation must be based on the sort of reasoning that most citizens can accept or reject. Citizens must be able to make counterproposals through public debate without being open to charges about their religious piety. Civic reason and reasoning, and not personal beliefs and motivations, are necessary whether Muslims constitute the majority or the minority of the population of the State. Even if Muslims are the majority, they will not necessarily agree on what policy and legislation should follow from their Islamic beliefs.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Abd al-Razeq, Ali (2012). *al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm*. Cairo. Introduction by Ammar Ali Hassan. Dar al-Kutub al-Masri, p. 88.

<sup>6</sup> Naim, Àbd Allah Ahmad (2008). *Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Sharia*. Harvard University Press, p.1.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 8.

The negationist approach within Islamic movements mainly reflects a fundamentalist point of view which portrays Democracy as 'blasphemy and the mother of all evils'. It rejects any forms of interaction, dialogue, comparison or mimesis between Islam and Democracy. Islamic negators focus their militant discourses on the issues of legislation and sovereignty.<sup>8</sup>

al-Hallaq, however, argues that the establishment of an Islamic State within the frame of a modern system is impossible because of the contradiction between the modern principle and authorities with Islam as each side has its own system that contradicts the other. Besides, he denies the possibility of reconciliation between them. "The Islamic governance is based on ethical, legal, political, social and metaphysical foundations that are radically different from the foundations that support the Modern State<sup>9</sup> whose source is outside the human being, namely, God: "God is the only sovereign in defining the ethical values on which belief is based"<sup>10</sup>. Besides, the relationship between faith and good deeds is an organic structural relationship, which means that the existence of 'faith' absolutely includes the existence of good deeds and vice versa"<sup>11</sup> .

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<sup>8</sup> Hayrettin, Özler and, Yildirim, Ergun (2008). "Islam and Democracy: A False Dichotomy." *Insight Turkey*, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 87–99, 93.

<sup>9</sup> Hallaq, Wael (2014). *al-Dawla al-Mustahila /The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and Modernity's Moral Dilemma*. Tr. Amr Othman. Published by: The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, p. 105.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 108.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 173.

mimesis between Islam and Democracy. Islamic negaters focus their militant discourses on the issues of legislation and sovereignty.<sup>12</sup>

Political Islam denies the previous objections under the pretext that Islam is viable for every time and place, and Islam, in their view, possesses the sufficient flexibility for renovation and development, which makes its application in the Modern State a possible matter, and this discourse is characterized by approximation between the institutes and values of the Caliphate System and the Modern State System.

The idea of realization of Islam emerged out of the Modern State through gradual developments in the political thought among the Islamic movements, especially the movement of the Moslem Brothers. This development is considered a radical change in thought and practice as a transition from the idea of the Caliphate to acceptance of the Modern State and reconciliation between the two systems, through pointing out the similarity between the values of the Caliphate sSstem and the Modern State.

Acceptance of the Islamic movements under the pretext of "realism" means that they should integrate into a low position in the capitalistic globalization today. The discourse of liberal capitalism for globalization does not contradict the discourse of political Islam; actually, they fully complement each other.<sup>13</sup>

This study introduces the attitude of the political Islamic movements towards the Modern State; analyses their transition from the condition of claim for a caliphate to their acceptance of the system of a Modern State, which is represented in the

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<sup>12</sup> Hayrettin, Özler and, Yildirim, Ergun (2008). "Islam and Democracy: A False Dichotomy." *Insight Turkey*, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 87–99, 93.

<sup>13</sup> Amin, Samir (2018). *al-Islam al-Siyasi: al-Wajh al-Akher li al-Ra'smaliyya al-Mutawahhisha*. Cairo: Hizb al-Tajamu' al-Watani al-Taquadumi al-Wahdawi, p. 14-15.

participation and competition for the authority; and shows the structural contradictions in their political discourse.

### **The Moslem Brothers and the Islamic State**

After the fall of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1923, the Islamic World started talking about the Islamic State as an attempt to resume the Islamic System in the modern era believing that Islam is valid for any time and place.

In other words, the Islamic world started talking about possibility of the establishing an Islamic System in the frame of the Modern State and depending on the modern principles and authorities through bringing these principles closer to the Islamic thoughts.

The Islamic movements, known as political, adopted the idea of establishing a modern Islamic State through the system of a Modern State. One of the most important movements is the Movement of the Moslem Brothers, which was established in 1928 in Egypt, and is still considered the largest movement and the most influential and spreading one in the Islamic world. Besides, it is considered the Mother movement of the most Islamic movements in the present era.

The concept of the Islamic State has developed among the Moslem Brothers through their history that has extended for several decades, but it has been marred with epistemological and moral contradictions that have been reflected on their political discourse. At the beginning of its establishment, the movement called for the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate but it ended with its acceptance of the modern Nation State. Besides, its pursuit to establish the Caliphate State did not prevent it from participation in the project of the Modern State through participation in the parliamentary elections.

Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the movement, says in one of his messages: "We define the borders of nationality by 'faith' and they define them by the earthly

borders and geographical borders; and every spot that has a Moslem who says "There is no God but God and Mohammad is the Messenger of God is a homeland for us"<sup>14</sup>. He adds: "Islam, in this sense, does not acknowledge the geographical borders and does not take in consideration the race and blood differences, and considers the Moslems as one nation, and considers the Moslem homeland as one homeland no matter how far from one another the countries are and remate the borders are"<sup>15</sup>.

It is clear that the political project of the Moslem Brothers as al-Banna expressed it does not believe in the Nation State and seeks to establish the Caliphate State: "and therefore, it puts the idea of the caliphate and work to return it to be on the top of the list of their methods"<sup>16</sup> al-Banna's emphasis on the Caliphate System a central axis in the political discourse of the Moslem Brothers, which is a discourse that includes all the Moslems in the world and calls for a union of the Islamic countries under the umbrella of the universal caliphate.

Al-Banna thinks that the Caliphate System is compatible with refusal of the Nation State and it's a special system, such as the political pluralism that is represented in the existence of political parties that compete on authority, "and the Brothers believe that this partisanship has spoiled all the people's facilities, disrupted their businesses, ruined their morals, tore their links, and had the worst effect on their public and individual life.

They also believe that the Representation System and even the Parliamentary System do not need the Party System in its present form in Egypt, and without them, there would not be coalition governments in the democratic countries. The argument that says that the Parliamentary System cannot be achieved except by

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<sup>14</sup> al-Banna, Hassan (n.d.). *al-Rasa'il*. Beirut. Mu'asasat al-Risala, p. 119.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 309.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p. 312.

the existence of political parties is a weak argument as several constitutional parliamentary countries follow the One-party System, which is possible to achieve"<sup>17</sup> and "after all of this, I believe, gentlemen, that Islam is a religion of unity in everything, a religion of the safety of bosoms, purity of hearts, right brotherhood, and true cooperation among human beings, let alone that the same nation and the same people do not approve of the Party-System and are not satisfied with it and do not accept it"<sup>18</sup>.

al-Banna's call for the Caliphate System and his refusal to the Nation State System made him refuse established principles in the Caliphate. It seems that al-Banna dealt with the State as an absolute contrast to the Caliphate and not only as different system. Therefore, his refusal to the multiparty political system was absolute despite the existence of political plurality in the Caliphate System, though it is different from the structure of parties in the Modern State. al-Banna did not distinguish between multi-political jurisprudence in the Caliphate System as a measure for public affairs and the political parties in the Modern State, which seeks to control all the daily life fields and formulate the citizen in a way that serves its goals. The political difference as a measure to administer the public affairs appeared at the Saqifah (632 h.) after the death of the Prophet, and characterized the various periods of the Caliphate. al-Banna was not aware of the development of the concept of policy and difference between the content of the concept in the Caliphate System and the Modern State System.

Al-Banna did not introduce a real alternative to the abolition of political parties or a modern Islamic System that fits with the development of the modern man or even commitment to the Caliphate System. Absence of the alternative made him abolish the political parties that are considered a fundamental component in the

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p. 315.

<sup>18</sup>al-Banna, Hassan (1937). *Risalat Mu'tamar Talabat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimin*. Cairo.

Modern State and the accept the totalitarian Dictatorial System. The political parties might not agree in their current version with the ethical and moral Islamic values, but dictatorship contradicts them more. al-Banna had to deal with two modern contemporary contradictory systems because he did not possess a clear perception of the Islamic regime that he called for.

Since the era of the Prophecy, the history of Islam has not witnessed unity in everything; it witnessed disagreements in opinion, reasoning, interpretation, jurisprudence and other issues of religion, let alone disagreements on secular issues, especially those that are related to administration and politics, and disagreement was considered a mercy and enrichment to the history of Islam.

The unity of the nation or people could be achieved on elevated goals such as learning religion by heart or the high interests of the nation, because the religious schools and denominations in the Islamic history mostly believed in the unity of the nation's high values but they differed in their means and interpretations regarding the manner of achieving those goals, and this does not concern the Moslems only, as we find that the parties in the Modern State do not differ over the high values of the state or the constitution of the state but they differ regarding the means that achieve those goals.

Abolition of disagreement contradicts God's law in his creation and with the Islamic application through the history which was characterized by protection of different freedoms and avoidance of coercion. It deserves mentioning in this context that the freedoms that people enjoyed during the Caliphate System was broader and deeper than what was prevalent in the Modern State and even in a most modern and more liberal states in the present era.

Unilateral thought contradicts the One-party System of governance that is adopted by al-Banna arguing that it stems from Islam and is represented through the Islamic application for thirteen centuries, as the Islamic culture witnessed the spread of schools and intellectual and religious thoughts and denominations,

which practiced their right of free expression of thoughts under the protection of the Caliphate and its nurture. The Islamic culture had intellectual pluralism and cultural difference, and witnessed intellectual debates under the care of the Caliphate and the Caliphate institute did not impose its opinion and thought on the Islamic nation but safeguarded the freedoms for all the different groups<sup>19</sup>.

The idea of abolition of parties is in harmony with the logic that is based on the principle of conformity and contradiction, the unity of truth and its non-diversity. This logic does not accept participation and classifies issues positively or negatively, and you either possess the truth or lack it. It is a purely mental logic which is characterized by consistency and absoluteness; it does not deal with the reality and does not suit it; it contradicts the logic of similarity and dissimilarity that is in harmony with the changing reality. al-Banna expressed this approach in his messages: "It is a call that does not accept partnership as its nature is oneness, and he who is ready for that lives with it and it lives with him; and he who is unable to accept this burden will be deprived from the reward of the mujahidin (= strugglers), and will be among the left behind, and will stay with the sitters"<sup>20</sup>. It is possible to say that the logic of thought of the Brothers' discourse in politics will necessarily produce a Dictatorial System that does not accept the different other, and does not allow religious or civil freedom because it considers itself as representative of the absolute truth, religion and right.

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<sup>19</sup> The term 'provision of freedoms' refers to providing freedoms in general which characterized most of the historical eras of the Islamic Caliphate, which extended over twelve centuries, but this does not mean that there were no exceptional periods that witnessed oppression and injustice, especially during the periods of weakness and transition of authority and internal fighting and external invasions.

<sup>20</sup> al-Banna, Hassan, *al-Rasa'il*, 1937, p. 110.

al-Banna is not satisfied with the refusal of parties and concentration on their drawbacks, but it also refers to the advantage of the 'single party', which is an obvious reference to the dictatorial total regime that does not permit the existence of a Multiparty System. Besides, it does not accept the existence of a political opposition, as it is a system that is based on the dominance of the ruling party and imposition of the one-thought party. This means that the Brothers' have the right for authority and the right to abolish the right of the others, arguing that they represent Islam only rather than non-Moslems.

Despite the exclusionary discourse, the first participation of the Brothers in Egypt took place in February 1942 when the General Guide Hassan al-Banna ran as a candidate for the al-Ismailia constituency for the Egyptian House of Parliament<sup>21</sup>. The Moslem Brothers ran again for the House of Parliament at the end of 1944 elections – Hassan al-Banna ran as a candidate for al-Ismailia constituency, and a number of the Brothers' leadership ran in other constituencies. The pressure of the British and the Government of Ahmad Maher al-Sa'diya failed to force the Brothers to withdraw, and consequently, the British practiced all their pressure and ways of forgery, and the British army interfered and prevented the voters from voting to the candidates of the Brothers, and thus, the Brothers did not win any seat<sup>22</sup>.

We notice here the duplication and double standards of the Brothers' political discourse, where the call for the establishment of a caliphate contradicts the nation-state, besides their participation in the Nation-State system under the British colonialism. In addition, participation in the Parliamentary elections and

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<sup>21</sup> Abd al-Halim, Mahmoud (1994). *Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun – Ahdath Sana'at al-Tarikh: Ru'ya min al-Dakhil*. Dar al-Da'wa li al-Nashr wa al-Tab'i wa al-Tawzi'. 5<sup>th</sup> ed., 1/314. Alexandria.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p. 1/348.

the acceptance of the Multiparty System are considered a crossing of the line of the discourse of the one-party system. This contradiction expresses the gap between slogan and practice or the theoretical and the practical discourse. This integration in the system of the Nation State might be justified as a temporary tactic that is required by the current circumstances or an interim stage towards their goal of the establishment of the Islamic collective Caliphate.

This justification can be countered by two objections:

1. Integration in the system of a Nation-State cannot lead to the Caliphate system because there is a complete contradiction between the two systems in both form and content.
2. The call for integration as an interim policy means the acceptance and commitment temporarily and violation of agreements in the phase of empowerment. This policy contradicts the value and ethical principles on which Islam is based.

It is possible to interpret this contradiction in the Brothers' discourse as a result of their epistemological ignorance of the difference between the two systems of the Nation-State and the Caliphate-State. Some people might think that the difference between the two systems is a quantitative difference in space, size and number, but the truth is that the difference is originally quantitative, which is a contradiction between the fundamental principles on which each system is based. This contradiction makes the movement from one system to the other an impossible mission.

What I mean by the establishment of 'the Modern Nation State' is the establishment of a state that is limited by a fixed geographic frame, authority and people under a constitutional understanding, a state that was created by the influence of the overlapping of the concept of 'nation' and 'caliphate', the hybrid concept of 'the Islamic State', which we probably witnessed for the first time in

the writings of certain jurists and not in the writings of Islamic movement activists. It seems that al-Azhar Sheikh Abd al-Wahab Khalaf was the first person who coined this term in his book *al-Siyasa al-Shar'iyya*. It was easy for this hybridity between the concepts of 'Caliphate' and 'the Modern State' to lead Imam Hassan al-Banna to raise this term (al-Dawla al-Islamiya/ the Islamic State), considering it a slogan in his famous messages, while the real essential concept of the "Islamic State" was "the image of the state and the shadow of the Caliphate".<sup>23</sup>

The political approach of the Moslem Brothers' continued after Egypt's independence from the British colonialism and the establishment of the Nation State. They showed readiness to take part in the new system despite its contradiction with the Caliphate system. "After the Revolution on 23<sup>rd</sup> of July, 1952, the members of the Revolution demanded to nominate names to take part in the Ministry. The Guidance Office nominated three members of the group, but Jamal Abd al-Nasser and his men wanted well-known and famous people among the Egyptian people such as: Shaikh Ahmad Hassan al-Baqouri and Sheikh Mohammad al-Ghazali, and therefore, they refused to nominate the Guide or the Office of Guidance, and actually offered the Ministry of Awqaf to al-Shaikh al-Baqouri, who accepted the offer in principle, and notified the Brothers about that but they stipulated that he should resign from the Group/ al-Jama'a"<sup>24</sup>. The Brothers' agreement to take part in a dictatorial regime that does not allow political party-pluralism and suppresses the opposition whatever its form is, and

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<sup>23</sup> al-Haj, Abd al-Rahman (2006). *Mafhum al-Dawla al-Haditha wa Ishkalatuha fi al-Fikr al-Islami al-Siyasi al-Mu'asser*. Amman. Markaz al-Quds li al-Dirasat al-Siyasiya.

<sup>24</sup> al-Qardhawi, Yusuf (2009). *Mudhakarar Yusuf al-Qardhawi – Khatimat al-Juz' al-Awal: Sira wa Masira*. Islam Online. A Preserved Copy of December 7th, 2009. Wayback Machine Website.

devotes the system of the one-party regime indicates intellectual shallowness, harms the credibility of the Brothers' political discourse and exposes them as authority seekers for itself rather than a project sponsor.

The Moslem Brothers continued their political participation through the Parliamentary Elections in 1976 on individual basis, and their representative Shaikh Salah Abu Ismael succeeded and supported Mr. Adel Eid in 1979. Both of them succeeded: Shaikh Salah Abu Ismael and Haj Hassan al-Jamal, and people attributed to them "the most important political and constitutional achievement by the Moslem Movement in this era", which is reflected in turning the Islamic Sharia into the main source of legislation in Egypt in 1979, besides forming committees that were headed by Dr. Sufi Abu Talib to canonize and review the laws according to the requirements of Sharia.

The Brothers ran in the Egyptian Elections in 1984 and won six seats within a coalition with al-Wafd Party under the slogan of *Islam is the Solution*. In 1987, the Brothers entered the Parliament within the Islamic Coalition between the Brothers, the Egyptian Labor Party and the Freedom Party. They also entered the elections under the slogan of *Islam is the Solution*. The Moslem Brothers participated in all the Parliamentary Elections of 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2011.

We notice that there has been a strategic change in the political discourse of the Brothers in the 1980s, which was reflected in making coalitions with secular political parties such as al-Wafd Party. These coalitions reflect a cardinal change on the level of political treatment with the different 'other', and fully contradicts with al-Banna's discourse that refuses party-pluralism. It also contradicts the principle of coalition with other parties "and on this occasion, I would like to say that the Moslem Brothers believe in the futility of the idea of coalition between parties, and believe that it is just a sedative and not a therapy, and soon the coalitionists assault one another and the war between them returns more severe

than it used to be before their coalition, and the successful critical therapy is that these parties should disappear"<sup>25</sup>.

The slogan of 'Islam is the Solution' indicates the simplicity of the Brothers' understanding of Islam. Islam is a comprehensive system that is based on principles and values that are specific to it and contradict the principles of the Nation State. Thus, the Islamic solution requires an Islamic System and it cannot solve a problem in another system, because the Islamic System is intertwined and compound, which means that these parts and components are interconnected and no part can be independent in itself or exist in itself disconnected from other components. Therefore, it is impossible to transfer an Islamic solution to a certain problem to a non-Islamic system, and if that happens, it becomes a sort of inappropriate and disgusting 'patches'.

After the 25<sup>th</sup> of January, 2001 Revolution in Egypt, the Moslem Brothers officially established a political party called the Freedom and Justice Party on June 6<sup>th</sup>, 2011 in order to run in the Parliamentary elections. This party and the Democratic Alliance for Egypt party won the majority of votes (47%) in the Parliamentary elections of 2012 for the Egyptian People's Assembly. The number of seats that the Freedom and Justice Party and the Democratic Alliance won was 233 seats but in June 14<sup>th</sup>, the Supreme Constitutional Court in Egypt ruled that the People's Assembly should be dissolved.

On June 16<sup>th</sup>, 2012, and on the first presidential elections after the 25<sup>th</sup> of January Revolution, the results of the return round of the elections were announced, and Dr. Muhammad Morsy, the member of the Guidance Office and Head of the Justice and Freedom Party that belongs to the Moslem Brothers was declared as the first civil president for Egypt. And thus, the Brothers succeeded in reaching

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<sup>25</sup> al-Banna, Hassan, *al-Rasa'il*. 1937, p. 318.

the governance platform 84 years after the establishment of the Group/ al-Jama'ah.

It is possible to say that the real change in the political discourse of the Moslem Brothers occurred after the 2011 Revolution, where they gave up the idea of Caliphate completely, and became fully convinced that they can apply Islam through the Nation State. In the Group's press release about the popular revolution on February 9<sup>th</sup>, 2011, the components of the Nation State were introduced as follows:

First: the people "is the bearer of authorities and the bearer of sovereignty", and the "state is established on a civil basis and a human constitution, wherever its source is, on respect of law and on equality, freedom and belief". The Group confirms that they believe in a Multi-party System without breach of the constants of the nation<sup>26</sup>.

Considering the people as the bearer of sovereignty, and that the constitution is human, are two fundamental principles for the secular Nation State, but in Islam, God is the bearer of sovereignty, and the Koran is the constitution. This declaration is considered as an abandonment of two fundamental principles in Islam and two slogans that were specific to the movement of the Moslem Brothers over decades of years. Besides, it is a denial of the literatures of the movement that established these concepts in the minds of its followers.

It deserves mentioning that none of the Moslem caliphates dared to abandon the Divine Sovereignty to the advantage of the people through the history of Islam, because the principle of sovereignty is considered a fundamental principle in Islam, and actually, the first principle on which other principles are established.

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<sup>26</sup> al-Aryan, Essam (2007). Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun wa Mafhum al-Dawal. On: <https://marebpress.net/articles.php?lang=arabic&id=2789>. Retrieved on Nov. 8, at 06:47.

The sovereignty of God and the Koran as a constitution of the nation was not a source of dispute in the history of the Moslems; it was above everyone, whether a caliph or a nation. The caliph is equal to every Moslem in his declaration of obedience to God and his Koranic orders. Thus, the Brothers are considered to go beyond the first principles of Islam in the name of Islam.

Second, the press release continues to establish the modern concepts and values that the Western modernity produced, showing its non-contradiction with Islam. "The concepts of Shura do not clash with the acceptance of the best of what the human societies have reached in their practice of democracy in our present era, including the forms, rules, procedural and artistic ways to organize unanimity and improvement of authority exercise, and guarantee its currency peacefully, and expand the circle of popular participation in it, and activation of observation on it, and activate observation on it, because the contemporary practical application of the Shura as a political, constitutional, and parliamentary keystone does not lack the Shura concepts as they are established and confirmed in our Islamic Sharia"<sup>27</sup>.

The press release compares between Shura and Democracy and is inclined to seek prevalence of democracy from the point of view of its procedural forms and ways and consideration to be

the practical application of Shura. There is no doubt that there is similarity between Democracy and Shura on the artistic and the practical level, but the contrast between them is clear on the epistemological and moral level, namely, the difference between the values that stand behind each of them and represents the spirit of each of them.

This comparison constitutes emptying the establishing values of Shura and introducing it as a skeleton without a soul. Fascination of the Brothers' press

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

release and its identification with the Western democracy indicates an epistemological ignorance of the principles of the Western Democratic System, which neither accepts the different one in his thought and existence, nor have any problem with excluding the other different side. These Western modernist thoughts prepared not only the occupation of the land of the other, but allowed his evacuation, substitution and destruction. The inquisition courts, colonialism and their deeds, the policies of the contemporary Western democratic countries towards the other countries of the world, the exploitation and robbery of their resources, staging of wars and destruction of peoples and countries out of greed for their wealth and fortunes are direct results of the modernist Western thought which is difficult to describe as a human thought that preserves a place for the different other.

Third, a Parliamentary State: at the Second pledge at al-Aqabah, the Messenger, God's blessing and peace be upon him, asked them to send their representatives to come out to him, and twelve representatives were sent as guarantees to their people. Ahl al-Hal wa al-Aqd (People of loosening and binding) or the people of choice are the ones who represent in the modern constitutional system the Parliamentary authority. The duty of this Parliamentary System is the formulation and passing laws according to the legitimate constitutional authority, controlling of the executive authority and its accountability, and approval of the plans and the general policy of the state, besides the financial control of the government<sup>28</sup>.

Comparison between Ahl al-Hal wa al-Aqd and the members of the Parliament is characterized by simplicity and superficiality, because Ahl al-Hal wa al-Aqd were not politicians in the meaning that the members of the Parliament enjoy in the Modern State. Ahl al-Hal wa al-Aqd gained this significant position because

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

of their possession of a lot of gracious virtues, while virtue for the politician is merely a tool for the sake of domination and authority.

Fourth, the State of Citizenship; the citizen is the individual who belongs to a political entity (state), and the patriotic affinity does not contradict the national or religious affinity. The term "citizen" includes "every person who belongs to a homeland without discrimination because of his race, sex or color. The Islamic State includes citizens of different religious beliefs, provided that they belong to this homeland, and the title of affinity is the document of nationality"<sup>29</sup>.

Consideration of the National State as an Islamic State indicates substitution of the Caliphate by a Nation State, and thus, the document of nationality becomes a condition for one's affiliation to it, which implies that it abridges the concept of the Islamic Nation, which joins all Moslems into one national affiliation, into a limited geographical area. This change contradicts with the historical attitude of the Brothers regarding nationalism and nationality undoubtedly, the new discourse will shock the followers of the Brothers in the Islamic World, who are still attached to the call for the Caliphate.

The abovementioned press release expresses in a clear undoubted way the Brothers' conviction of the Nation State or the Modern State. Besides, the press release preferred to use the term of the Modern State in order to avoid the use of the two terms of 'the 'National State' and the 'Modern' State, but this does not change the truth of the indicated entity in anything as the two terms are considered merely a play on words about the same indicated entity.

The significance of the press release lies in establishing the system of the Nation State doctrinally and jurisprudentially, where this attempt is considered a sort of bridging over the fundamental disagreements between the two systems, which is also a sort of blurring of the contradictions between the two systems and

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

flattening of the Islamic values. The comparison that the press release made is purely formal and ignores the value-content and the morals that stand behind it. The centrist-current borrows from the Modern State some of its tools so that they will become a part of the Islamic System or to rediscover parts of the jurisprudence legacy via certain modern concepts in order to reconstruct the Imamiya according to the image of the State and thus, they create a system which is neither from the heritage nor modern without building a comprehensive proportional method that serves their conceptions about the jurisprudence of the state"<sup>30</sup>.

Abd al-Ilah Balqaziz described this change in the politics of the Brothers and its influence on the Moslem movements saying: "The Islamic revivalist movements reconciled with the Nation State, considered it the frame of their work, adapted their Da'wa project to their entity and human geography after a long resistance and reluctance and objection, got carried away with introducing the surplus of concessions to their political system and their non-religious position, gave it its legitimacy, and their majority acknowledged the fundamental law of the secular state (constitution), entered the elections under the requirements of its provisions, entered the institutes of a state that had been considered faithless, and some of them managed to take part in running the local and central authority without being blemished by their opponents or accused of breaking the laws. In short, the scenario of the experience of the Brothers was repeated in every

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<sup>30</sup> al-Khatib, Mu'taz (2013). "al-Wasatiya al-Islamiya wa Fiqhal-Dawla: Qira'ah Naqdiyya". *Majallat Tabayun li al-Dirasat al-Fikriya wa al-Thaqafiya*. Vol.1, Issue 3, 83, pp. 167-192.

Egyptian who was reached by the power of the Islamists and their authority crept into him"<sup>31</sup>

The Brothers' acceptance of the Civil State – as they like to call it in order to avoid the use of the term 'the Secular State'– does not change the truth in anything. It is a kind of lexical evasion which, in their opinion, can save them from their embarrassment because they consider 'secularism' a contradictory concept to Islam and retreat from it. Actually, the Civil State is the same as the Nation State or Secular State in all their components and characteristics. It is the state that separates between religion and politics, namely, exclusion of religion from the public life and considering it a personal matter in the best case, and domination of the political matter on the different aspects of life in the state.

Undoubtedly, the Brothers' press release represents a real change against their history and literatures; a movement from the discourse of the caliphate as an Islamic System to the discourse of modernity and secularism, which is the substitution of the Islamic values by Western values. We cannot look at this approach as a renewal or a development of the Islamic System, but an abolition to it and a revolution against it. This change takes place at a time when the Nation State suffers from structural problems, and passes through violent crises that threaten its foundations while the supporters of the Nation State look for solutions to these problems with no avail.

I believe that the reason for this change in the political discourse among the Brothers is the absence of a deep vision in the Islamic System and the fascination by the system of the Nation State. The Brothers suffer from intellectual and epistemological poverty in the nature and essence of the Islamic system, and live on preaching and attachment to the external forms of Islam. The Brothers missed

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<sup>31</sup> Balqaziz, Abd al-Ilah (2009). "al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn wa al-Uruba: Mufaraqat Wa'iy!" *Jaridat al-Safir*, 2.

the point that Islam is a comprehensive, integrative, and overlapping system that is impossible to apply through another system as it is impossible to apply the system of socialism in a capitalistic system and vice versa. The Islamic System is self-contained and stands alone; independent and based on total principles, whose branches are connected with these totalities, and these branches cannot live by separating them from these totalities. This means that application of Islam as a system requires a change of the existing system, which is the system of the Nation State, rather than its restoration or beautification with Islamic names and terms, but rather by reestablishment of an Islamic System that is based on Islamic principles and values or derived from them.

In spite of the criticisms that can be directed at the Caliphate System regarding the deviations during limited periods, the Caliphate represents a human system that preserves the rights of the different 'other' and provides different freedoms for the whole people regardless of their intellectual, religious and national affinity. The Brothers' epistemological poverty led to their abandonment of a human system to the advantage of a racial system that does not respect the human being as a human being.

From what has been said above, we can see the stark contrast in the political thought among the Brothers through the duality of al-Banna's discourse, which supports and opposes the Caliphate System and refuses and accepts the Nation State System of the Caliphate and integrates with it at the same time. It appears that the Brothers had completely abandoned the idea of the Caliphate in the eighties of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and adopted the Nation State System as a valid and suitable system for the application of Islam.

This movement from the Caliphate System to the Nation State system is not merely a choice on the instrumental artistic level but an abandonment of the establishing principles of Islam and adoption of the modernist principles that contradict with Islam. This contradiction lies in the point that actions in Islam

are connected to moral values that cannot be separated from Islam, while the central idea of modernity is based on separation of morals and politics. Thus, by choosing the system of the modern state, the Brothers give up the essential principles of Islam, which makes their Islamic slogans void of the spirit of religion and contradict the Islamic concepts that have crystallized throughout the Islamic history, especially the political concept and its role in the Islamic System.

### **The Attitude of the Islamic Movements in the Islamic World**

Some Islamic movements are considered branches of the movement of the Islamic Brothers in Egypt such as in Jordan and Kuwait. Other movements are connected in intimate relationships with the Brothers but they consider themselves independent of them, such as those in Sudan, Tunis, Palestine, Maghreb and Turkey. These movements do not differ from the movement of the Moslem Brothers in Egypt in their belief in the possibility of the application of Islam through the Modern State system, and their belief that the modern political values fit in with the Islamic values, but the difference between these movements is in the clarity of perception, the credibility of participation and acceptance of the Modern State System.

The Islamic Renaissance Movement (Harakat al-Nahda) in Tunis was among the first Islamic movements that accepted the system of the Modern State publicly. Its discourse was characterized by full clarity and intellectual consistency. Its founder, Rached al-Ghannouchi, expressed this approach and defended the institutes of the Modern State such as the multi-party and the Parliament System and its democratic values and freedoms, arguing that they represent Islam and its values. He did not see through the political Islam any contradiction between the Democratic System and Islam, and he diligently tried to approximate them to

each other and establish that jurisprudentially and doctrinally<sup>32</sup> "Islam and democracy are 'twins' through reconciliation, and Shura in Islam in its modern form is represented in democracy"<sup>33</sup>. Al- Ghannouchi builds his biased call and preference to the system and values of the Modern State on his denial of its opposite, namely, the totalitarian Dictatorship State. He did not see the possibility of building an Islamic political model that is dependent on a system of Islamic values or benefitting from the historical Islamic legacy in politics and governance. Besides, his claim that Islam and democracy are identical can be considered ignorance of the essential difference between the two systems. In addition, similarity between the branches does not mean that they are identical. We might find similarity between Shura and Democracy on the instrumental level, such as the choice of the ruler and representation of the people and provision of freedoms and human rights, but the difference lies in the values and principles that stand behind these appearances.

This approach contradicts al-Ghannouchi's previous attitudes regarding the Modern State through which he emphasized the difference between the State and the Islamic System; "the Islamic State is not a totalitarian state as it can nearly be deprived of legislation, especially the original legislation: legislation of religious beliefs, values, halal and haram, good and evil. Besides, it is concealed from the intellectual and educational authority, and its authority is very limited in the field of financial authority: authority of imposition of taxes that are limited by Sharia in its largest part. Its authority is also limited in the judiciary field,

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<sup>32</sup> al-Ghannouchi, Rached (2012). *al-Democratiya wa Huquq al-Insan fi al-Islam*. Markaz al-Jazera li al-Dirasat wa al-Dar al-Arabiya li al-Ulum Nasherun. Daoha; Beirut.

<sup>33</sup> al-Ghannouchi, Rached (2019). *al-Islam wa al-Democratiya Taw'aman*. *Al-Quds al-Arabi*. On issue of February, 26<sup>th</sup>.

legislatively and executively. This field enjoys a large independence of the ruler which is the specialization of its professionals. By that, he makes the power of the governor a very limited executive power to the advantage of the power of legislation and society and the other institutions that represent them"<sup>34</sup>

al-Gannouchi also depends on the historical experience pointing out the role of society in the Islamic System, and emphasizes the cooperative relationship and integration between the two authorities; "If the state functions were not entirely fixed and were widening and narrowing through their interaction with the needs of the nation, it was certainly not a totalitarian state that was swelling up at the expense of its society. It was the opposite to that; its historical experience witnesses that its authority was limited, and society was performing was doing its functions independent of it in education, legislation, health, and social security, and it interfered when society was helpless. We should go towards such a model: strengthening the role of society and expanding it at the expense of the government so that it will rightly become an obedient support with limited authorities and simple components provision"<sup>35</sup>. al-Gannouchi introduces a perspective of a system of education as a social institution that works independently of the state: "Establishment of an educational system that promotes knowledge and makes its tools available, and lifts the authority of the state from the people's minds and souls. The performance of the job of teaching by the mosques is likely to turn them into universities and public centers of

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<sup>34</sup> al-Ghannouchi, Rached (2009). *Maba'i al-Hukm wa al-Sulta fi al-Islam*. On:

<https://www.aljazeera.net/specialfiles/pages/2321a16c-5ca8-4d7b-90a3-0afedd939ff7>

<sup>35</sup> al-Ghannouchi, Rached (1993). *al-Hurriyat al-Amma fi al-Dawla al-Islamiya*. Beirut, Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-Arabiya, p. 173.

education, narrows the authority of the state and, at the same time, decreases its burdens and strengthens the abilities of the civil society"<sup>36</sup>.

Limitation of the authority of the state and strengthening of the role of society contradict the system of the Modern Society, which is characterized by domination of all the fields of life, and al-Gannouchi's acceptance to the Modern State is a temporary attitude, "and democracy is the road of transition from the country or nation state to the state of the idea, the state of the nation" <sup>37</sup>.

It is possible to say that al-Gannouchi's attitude towards the Modern State is not clear. On the one hand, he criticizes the state, defines its role, and introduces a model of an Islamic system that grants society a main role in various fields. On the other hand, he declares his support to the values and institutes of the Modern State. It is possible to attribute this ambiguity to the nature of his intellectual experience that went through two stages: the *first* was characterized by the influence of the historical Islamic experience in governance, and the life of exile and suppression that he lived under the Tunisian State. However, during the second stage after the 2011 Revolution, al-Gannouchi became the leader of the Nahda Movement and a central part in the Tunisian Government. The question remains open: does this transition explain the change in al-Gannouchi's attitude towards the Modern State and his belief in the possibility of the application of Islam through it? Or does he still think that the Modern State is a transit station to the Islamic state?

The Islamic movements (political Islam) adopted the idea of the establishment of a modern Islamic State through the system of the Modern State, and they worked on achieving it through their political participation in the system of a

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid., p. 327.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., p. 325.

modern nation state<sup>38</sup>. It is possible to refer to two main reasons for the acceptance of the Islamic movement to the modern system in politics:

First, the intellectual poverty, which prevented the Islamic movement from creating an Islamic model that constitutes a contemporary Islamic answer. Hassan al-Turabi, the leader of the Islamic movement in Sudan, admitted that by saying: "No wonder that when we assess the Islamic movement in Sudan, not from the perspective of the characteristics of its thought, but from the perspective of its value and level – we do not find it rich neither in its gains nor in its contributions"<sup>39</sup>.

Second, protection of the movement from the suppression of the autocratic oppressive regimes. Most of the Islamic movements suffered from oppression, exile and prevention of their political activity, and faced a lot of arbitrary judgements and executions against its activists and leaders, and thus, their choice of the system of the modern and democratic state was a way to push back the vices of dictatorship and in pursuit of security and freedom.

So, comparison between the Islamic system and the Modern State becomes an expression of an exceptional circumstance that comes up in order to meet specific interests and needs, and to prevent a harm of an event, but the generalization of this exception as a natural representation of Islam is considered evacuation of the Islamic concepts of their moral values.

In addition to that, equalization between the two systems means that the movements of political Islam separated between what should be and what exists, namely, separation of the concept from its values. This separation is the establishment of the idea of the Secular State in the West, which separated politics from religion or morals. There is a big difference between dealing with

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<sup>38</sup> al-Turabi, Hassan (1989). *al-Haraka al-Islamiya fi al-Sudan*. al-Khurtum, p.196-203.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., p. 227.

the Modern State as an imposed reality and accepting it and identifying with it. These movements could deal with this reality without adopting it, and at the same time, call for an Islamic model for governance, but they adopted the Modern State and considered it an Islamic State.

### **The Justice and Development Party (AKP)**

The Turkish model differs a lot from the models of Islamic movements in the Arab world. The Justice and Development Party adopted a reconciliatory approach between religion and secularism. It did not emphasize the differences between them, which are likely to lead to a clash with the secular system, but it declared its acceptance to secularism and worked on achieving the religious values within the secular system. Since the establishment of the Justice and Development Party, Erdogan declared that his party will preserve the fundamentals of the republican regime and will not enter into arguments with the Turkish military troops. He said: "we will follow a clear and active policy in order to reach the goal that Ataturk decided in order to establish a civilized contemporary society in the frame of the Islamic values in which 99% of the Turkish population believe<sup>40</sup>. In spite of the fact that the Islamic movement in Turkey came to power, it did not claim that the Turkish state is an Islamic state, and repeatedly declared that Turkey is a secular state. The AKP (Justice and Development Party) defines itself as a "conservative democratic" party, not as an Islamist party.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Kuro, T. Ahmad (2013). *Siyasa Dhat Marji'iyā Diniya bidon Dawla Islamiya: Hal Yumkin An Yakun Hizb al-Adala wa al-Tanmiya al-Tuki Namuzajan li al-Islamiyin al-Arab?* Brookings, p.3.

<sup>41</sup> Angel Rabasa and F. Stephen Larrabee (2008). *The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey*. RAND Corporation, p. 31.

"The Justice and Development Party under the leadership of Erdogan is not an Islamic party; it is a secular party that respects the faith of the Turkish people and its creed"<sup>42</sup>. This attempt to reconcile between secularism and religion contributed to the widespread of the party and expansion of its popular bases, which included different sections of the Turkish people. "What Erdogan wanted was to establish a political reconciliation between *Atatürkism* and Islam; a reconciliation that allows the establishment of a rational regime that puts an end to the State's war against religion, and prevents the explosion of conflict between the supporters of the Islamic identity and the guards of the secular values of the republic"<sup>43</sup>.

This means that the Turkish Islamic movement is aware of the difference between the two regimes and believes that its participation in the secular state prepares for the establishment of an Islamic state in the future. This preparation for an Islamic system focused its effort on the essential human matters and decreased its focus on the superficial issues. Its activity was focused on the development of the human being and his dignity, and not on his clothes and external appearance, while the Arab movements do the opposite completely as they focused on the clothes and neglected the thoughts.

For AKP (Justice and Development Party) supporters, wearing the headscarf (hijab) is a matter of personal choice, and restrictions that are imposed on its use are violations of individual rights. As a practical matter, the ban on the headscarf presents young religious women with the choice of removing the scarf (and

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<sup>42</sup> Nafi, Bashir (2006). *al-Haraka al-Islamiya fi Turkiya: Azamat al-'Ilmaniya al-Shamila*. Al-Jazeera. On:  
<https://www.aljazeera.net/specialfiles/pages/84246fe0-4496-4ef7-82f6-d46c7eaa3110>.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

violating their religious obligation or convictions) or not being able to attend a public university or enter an official space.<sup>44</sup>

This indicates the transmission of the headscarf (hijab) from a religious issue to an issue that is related to personal freedom, which represents a central principle in secularism. Defense of hijab depended on the secular values and principles being considered one of the fundamental rights of the individual and not on religious causes.

"The Justice and Development Party argues that every woman should have the right to dress as she likes. The wearing the headscarf (hijab) is defended as a "basic" right<sup>45</sup>.

It is noticed that the Justice and Development Party adopted the approach of gradual application of religious issues through secular principles. This approach gained the support of the religious current who considered it application of the orders of the Islamic Sharia, and was also accepted by the seculars who considered it a part of the basic freedoms and rights that do not contradict the secular values.

The AKP (Justice and Development Party) gradually banned alcoholic beverages from the cafeterias of ministries and state agencies. Municipal governments controlled by the AKP restricted the consumption of alcohol in public places, providing the interesting reason that this was not done to adhere to the prescriptions of the Sharia, but rather – like in the United States – for the protection of the citizens' health and the reduction in public health expenses that

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<sup>44</sup> Rabasa, Angel and Larrabee, F. Stephen (2008). *The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey*, RAND Corporation, p. 61.

<sup>45</sup> Karakas, Cemal (2007). "Islam and Laicism between the Interests of State", Politics, and Society, Post-Islamists or Islamists? Objectives and Actions of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), *Peace Research Institute*: Frankfurt, p. 33.

would result from it. Moreover, AKP politicians have repeatedly made headlines for wanting to divide public parks and beaches into men's and women's areas according to Islamic criteria, or to introduce separate women-only days for public swimming pools – arguing that the latter are offered even in Christian Europe.<sup>46</sup>

The belief of the movement in Turkey in the gradual change appears through its political participation. However, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been in power in Turkey for two decades, there has been no essential change in the political system and public life in Turkey, and we notice that change is taking place modestly but consistently. The AKP (Justice and Development Party) confirms its commitment to the democratic system and respect of the law and the market economy, and sees that the role of the state is limited to the frame of organization and supervision and non-interference in the economic activity. It also supports the investments and privatization as a way for building a prosperous economy. The party also and sees that the social security is a constitutional right and the state should make this right available to all the individuals"<sup>47</sup> .

Turkey's success under the leadership of the Justice and Development Party in politics is clear in its influence and power on the regional and international levels. Besides, Turkey witnesses an economic growth that is represented in the establishment of the infrastructure, development of the tools of production, and progress in industry and trade. This growth is reflected on the daily life, intellectual and behavioral level, which results in social change.

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid., p. 32.

<sup>47</sup> Ghazali, Abd al-Halim (2007). *Al-Islamiyun al-Judud wa al-Imaniya al-Usuliya fi Turkiya*. Cairo: Maktabat al-Shuruq al-Dawliya, p. 29.

The acceptance of the Islamic movement to the system of the modern state is represented in its integration with the political system and its institutes through the Justice and Development Party. The party derives its legitimacy through the laws of the state and its commitment to them on the level of the internal organization and its political public activity, namely, exercising the democratic values in the political work and its emphasis on the historical and national Turkish legacy.

Even if the Islamists are using commitment to a secular democratic form of government only for tactical reasons, working within the secular system will actually change the party itself, and its members will come to have a more pragmatic view of the advantages of the secular system.<sup>48</sup>

There is another basic characteristic of the Justice and Development Party, which is its pragmatic understanding of politics that is based on religious authority. This way of understanding allows the party to occupy a place between excluding secularism on the one hand and Islam on the other. According to this perspective, the Moslem individuals and groups can promote their Islamic opinions in a democratic system through legislative operations and participation in political or judicial institutes and participation in the civil society and social media.

For example, it is possible to reflect Islamic morals through fighting corruption and nepotism, or strengthening justice. Besides, it is possible for different Islamic parties to promote their understanding of Sharia through free and democratic operations. In this way, there is no need for an official naming of the state as an "Islamic" state in order to strengthen the Islamic principles in politics. After all, there are many states that call themselves "Islamic States" that in reality

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<sup>48</sup> Naa'im, Àbd Allah Ahmad (2008). *Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Sharia*. Harvard University Press, p. 221.

fail to support things that a lot of people consider "Islamic Principles" in the daily politics".<sup>49</sup>

The Justice and Development Party did not adopt a strict educational program as a condition for political affinity, which contributed to the widespread of the party among the Turkish citizens in a relatively short period. Besides, the affinity of the Turks to the Hanafi doctrine contributed to the development of concepts from the Islamic legacy and appropriating them to the modern concepts, which can be attributed to the Hanafi doctrine, which gives more weight to giving precedence to opinion (ra'y) and ijihad over transfer (naql) and traditions (ather).

### **Summary and conclusion**

We conclude from the above that political Islam gave up the idea of the 'Caliphate', which characterized its political discourse, which called for resumption of the Islamic Caliphate and the refusal of the modern Nation State. However, this discourse has changed during the last three decades to the advantage of the 'Modern State', which is considered a developed model for the Caliphate System, through which it is possible to apply Islam. Political Islam worked on creating reconciliation between the Islamic values and modernist values, and resolving the differences between them, which contributed to the integration of the Islamic movements in the system of the modern state in the form of political parties that compete for power and authority.

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<sup>49</sup> Kuro, T. Ahmad (2013). *Siyasa Dhat Marji'ya Diniya bidon Dawla Islamiya: Hal Yumkin An Yakun Hizb al-Adala wa al-Tanmiya al-Tuki Namuzajan li al-Islamiyin al-Arab?* Brookings, p.2.